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Sammendrag 
Sammenkobling av kvotehandelssystemer for klimagasser blir ofte anbefalt av økonomer. Det kan gi 
opphav til effektivitetsgevinster på samme måte som sammenkobling av frihandelsområder ved at slik 
sammenkobling sikrer kostnadseffektivitet i utslippsreduksjoner mellom de tilknyttede 
jurisdiksjonene. Innenfor en relativt kort tidsperiode (5-10 år) er det rimelig og allment akseptert at 
man kan anta at marginale skader av CO2-utslipp for hver jurisdiksjon er konstante (selv om de kan 
være forskjellige mellom jurisdiksjoner). Med en slik antakelse blir analysen av sammenkobling av 
kvotehandelssystemer betydelig forenklet og vi utleder enkle uttrykk for kvoteprisene. Dette paperet  
1 Introduction
Abatement of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions is today’s premier global public good.
1 It is
difficult enough to resolve a local public goods problem within a jurisdiction having effective
governance with an ability to levy payments. But when the problem is international in
scope, and where there is no overarching top-down international governance structure, it
can render a global public goods problem virtually unsolvable.
The key issue here is the notorious free-rider problem. Everyone wants to free ride off
the contributions of others. A jurisdiction bears the full costs of its abatement, but it only
reaps a fraction of the global benefits. The result is a non-cooperative selfish equilibrium
where everyone abates far less than would be socially desirable in a cooperative solution.
The key issue is that it takes a strong government to enforce a socially desirable cooperative
solution. In the global arena there is no such strong international government with powers
to assign CO2 emissions targets and enforce penalties for non-compliance.
Reduced to its core essence, the COP21 Paris Agreement of 2015 is strictly a bottom-up
voluntary agreement based on a periodically repeated ‘pledge and review’ process. Just
before a performance period, at the end of the previous performance period, each country
volunteers a ‘nationally determined contribution’ (NDC) for its own CO2 emissions. After
the performance period (five years in COP21), actual emissions are reported but there are
no penalties for a country not complying with its own volunteered NDC. In this sense
the COP21 Paris Agreement is doubly voluntary: The self-announced pledges are strictly
voluntary in the first place, and compliance with the previous self-announced pledges in
the performance period is also strictly voluntary. The Agreement talks about developed
countries aiding developing countries with financial support for ‘sustainability’ based on
climate mitigation and adaptation, but the cash flows have thus far been meager.
Not surprisingly, there has been broad take-up of such a strictly voluntary agreement.
Before the U.S. dropped out, the COP21 Paris Agreement nominally covered countries ac-
counting for some 97 of world CO2 emissions. There is widespread acknowledgement that the
highly under-ambitious NDCs actually named are not nearly enough to keep global warming
on a track below the stated goal of no more than a worldwide average temperature increase
of 2◦C.
On the positive side, the COP21 Paris Agreement has highlighted the importance to
the international community of dealing with climate change. And it encourages credibly
transparent standards of reporting, monitoring, and verification by each participating coun-
1For expositional simplicity we pretend that carbon dioxide (CO2) is the only greenhouse gas (GHG).
CO2 is by a wide margin the most important GHG, but it is not the only GHG.
4
try, which is a necessary first step for any accord. COP21 also contains an agreement for
countries to pledge, review, and re-pledge new intended NDCs periodically (every five years),
hopefully inspiring ever-greater levels of NDC ambition over time.
What is the underlying ‘model’ of human behavior that might allow the COP21 Paris
Agreement to be seen as a step toward a resolution of the climate-change externality? There
appears to be an implicit assumption here that CO2 polluters will significantly drive down
their emissions voluntarily based largely on altruism and ‘blame and shame’ from others,
without any top-down setting of emissions targets or enforcement of penalties for non-
compliance. If only everyone followed the full golden rule, this line of reasoning might
begin with, the global-warming problem could be solved. The COP21 Paris Agreement
might then be seen as a first tentative step toward demonstrating the spirit of golden-rule-
like behavior, which might hopefully inspire further steps toward even more golden-rule-like
behavior by inspiring ever-more-ambitious NDC targets in a virtuous circle.
There seems to be little question but that some jurisdictions throughout the world have
gone beyond the most narrow definition of pure self-interest in proposing relatively more
ambitious emissions targets, even if this level of ambition still falls well short of full golden-
rule behavior. Altruism may thus help somewhat, and is to be encouraged, but most
economists would express at least partial skepticism about this golden-rule model because
it is typically difficult to resolve free-rider problems by altruism alone. In this paper we go
to the opposite extreme of altruistic behavior by examining the consequences of a model of
pure self interest.
A jurisdictional cap-and-trade system assigns allowances of CO2 caps to emitters within
a jurisdiction and then allows (or even encourages) internal free trade in permits. Total
emissions of CO2 must equal the sum of all allocated caps. Regulators of a cap-and-trade
system can thus control the total amount of CO2 emissions within their jurisdiction by
controlling the sum of all allocated caps. As economists have long emphasized, a cap-and-
trade system is cost effective because it minimizes total abatement costs for each chosen level
of total CO2 emissions via ensuring that every emitter in the jurisdiction sets its marginal
cost of abatement equal to the equilibrium price of permits.
Economists have typically advocated linkage of different cap-and-trade jurisdictions by
rough analogy with the beneficial linking of free-trade areas and on the more specific basis
that this will ensure cost effectiveness among the linked jurisdictions.2 An unlinked cap-
and-trade system guarantees cost effectiveness only within its own jurisdiction. A linked
cap-and-trade system goes further by also ensuring cost effectiveness among the linked ju-
2See, for example, the extremely comprehensive article of Mehling, Metcalf, and Stavins (2018), and the
numerous further references they cite.
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risdictions taken as a whole.
The argument for linkage based on cost effectiveness might make sense when there is
an overall top-down governance structure that can force Pareto-improving side payments
among the linked participants. But absent such a powerful overall governance structure,
this cost-effectiveness argument in a strictly voluntary cap-and-trade system loses its force.
Cap-and-trade jurisdictions that have linked their cap-and-trade systems will issue their own
voluntary caps on the basis of a host of domestic political-economy considerations including,
prominently, self interest. Narrow self interest, which is being modeled in this paper as if it
were the sole motivation, will cause linked jurisdictions to pay relatively little attention to
what is for them a strictly hypothetical argument about minimization of overall compliance
costs. Be that as it may, there is a widespread feeling among most economists that linking
cap-and-trade jurisdictions is a good idea.
The generally favorable attitude toward linkage has found its way into the COP21 Paris
Agreement.3 Paragraph 6.2 outlines a framework for recognizing traded obligations (called
‘international transfer of mitigation outcomes’) so that double counting is avoided because a
party to the agreement is allowed to include traded reductions undertaken by another party
to count toward the first party’s NDC. Paragraph 6.3 states that: ‘The use of internationally
transferred mitigation outcomes to achieve nationally determined contributions under this
Agreement shall be voluntary and authorized by participating parties’. The inclusion of
articles 6.2 and 6.3 opens the door to linking cap-and-trade systems (or, indeed, any market-
based mechanisms).
While linkage may give some jurisdictions incentives to choose more ambitious caps, it
could also give other jurisdictions incentives to choose less ambitious caps. It is a seeming
paradox that cap-and-trade among the parties to the Paris Agreement might lead to even
higher emissions. If linkage of cap-and-trade systems does little more than replace one
non-cooperative equilibrium with another, it will still be a far cry from the more cooperative
outcome that might accompany a genuine international governance structure.
The insight that linking voluntary cap-and-trade systems may lead to higher levels of
pollution emissions is not new.4 The most complete rigorous analysis of this possibility is
the pioneering work of Helm (2003), who models both unlinked and linked cap-and-trade
systems as a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium among self-interested countries. His fairly
general treatment of environmental pollution finds that overall effects on total emissions are
ambiguous and he derives moderately complicated conditions for when pollution is increased
3See Paris Agreement (2015).
4Early preliminary intimations of this tendency are expressed in Bohm (1992), Eyckmans and Proost
(1996), and Krishna and Tan (1999). This issue is also discussed later in Green, Sterner, and Wagner (2014)
and in Mehling, Metcalf, and Stavins (2018).
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or decreased by linkage.
An appropriate and widely accepted specification for the damages of CO2 emissions
within a relatively short (5-10 year) period is that marginal damages are constant for each
jurisdiction (although they can differ among jurisdictions). With this defensible assumption,
the analysis is significantly clarified and yields simple closed-form expressions for all (linked
and unlinked) CO2 permit prices. Some sharp insights are then available. How a linked
jurisdiction sets its voluntary caps relative to actual emissions (and whether the jurisdiction
buys or sells CO2 permits) is fully characterized by a simple linear proportionality condition
that depends only on the difference between the jurisdiction’s marginal damages and the
average marginal damages of the entire linked system. Some implications for linked and
unlinked voluntary CO2 cap-and-trade systems are derived and discussed.
2 The Model
The emphasis in the model of this paper is on clarity of exposition and the appealing sim-
plicity of clean crisp analytical results. Hopefully the model embodies enough of ‘reality’ to
give some useful insights on an important issue.
Let there be a total of n (≥2) cap-and-trade jurisdictions. Throughout this paper
we economize on notation by not redundantly pointing out that index i always runs from
i = 1, 2, ..., n or that index j always runs from j = 1, 2, ..., n. Henceforth it is understood
that i (or j) refer to one of the n jurisdictions under consideration.
For each i, the marginal damage of emissions within a pledge-and-review cycle is given
as di. The marginal damages curve is thus assumed here to be flat in emissions flows.
This assumption, which is standard in the climate-change literature, is appropriate for CO2
emissions because it is the stock of accumulated CO2 that does the damage and the relatively
small flow of CO2 emissions within, say, a 5-10 year period has an effectively linear impact
on the overall stock of atmospheric CO2. Let ei represent the emissions flow of jurisdiction
i. Let Di(E) denote the total damage to jurisdiction i of total emissions E ≡
∑
ei and
let D′i(E) represent the marginal damage to jurisdiction i of total emissions E. Then we
are assuming here that
D′i(E) = di, (1)
and the {di} coefficients thus provide an unambiguous ordering of the marginal damages of
emissions among the n cap-and-trade jurisdictions. 5 The constancy of marginal damages
5Note that, other things being equal, jurisdictions with higher (lower) populations will tend to have larger
(smaller) marginal damages of total emissions.
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for each jurisdiction, which is a natural assumption for CO2, allows for a simplification of
results, which seemingly has not been taken full advantage of in this literature.
On the abatement cost side, let Ci(ei) denote the cost to jurisdiction i of emissions ei,
where C ′i(ei) < 0 and C
′′
i (ei) > 0. Note, importantly, that the marginal cost of abatement
for jurisdiction i is minus C ′i(ei).
Let p be an exogenously imposed tax-price on emissions (it does not matter what is the
source of the tax-price p, so long as it is perceived as exogenous). Let ei here represent the
emissions quantity reaction of jurisdiction i to the tax-price p. The functional relationship
between ei and p is given by the condition that marginal abatement cost equals price, or
p = −C ′i(ei). (2)
Let the function ei(p) represent the inverse of the marginal cost of abatement function
−C ′i(ei) in (2). We can then write and conceptualize, whenever appropriate to the context,
that
ei = ei(p), (3)
where e′i(p) < 0 because C
′′
i (ei) > 0.
The two simple specifications (1) (which is very specific to CO2 ), and (3) (which is
entirely general for any cost functions {Ci(ei)} with C ′′i (ei) > 0) constitute the analytical
framework for the study of unlinked and linked voluntary cap-and-trade systems investigated
in this paper.6
3 Unlinked Voluntary Cap-and-Trade Systems
Independent unlinked jurisdiction i seeks to minimize over ei the expression Di(E) +Ci(ei).
Let the solution be denoted êi. Then êi satisfies the first-order condition D
′
i(
∑
êj) =
−C ′i(êi). Substituting from (1) and (3), this first-order condition translates into
êi = ei(di), (4)
with the corresponding autarchic-internal cap-and-trade emissions price being
p̂i = di. (5)
6We can only hope in this paper that, as is often the case in economic theory, an analytically-tractable flow
model, standing in for a more complicated stock-flow situation, is capable of offering some useful insights.
We have in mind here a pledge-and-review cycle of maybe five to ten years or so, which may be short enough
to justify the model specification here.
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Thus, it turns out, in the unlinked voluntary case of this model there is no strategic
interaction among the n jurisdictions.
The total emissions of all jurisdictions, denoted Ê, is then
Ê ≡
∑
êi =
∑
ei(di). (6)
The free-riding voluntary autarchic emissions levels {êi} do not, by a wide margin, rep-
resent socially optimal emission levels. The socially optimal level of ei, denoted e
∗
i , satisfies
the Lindahl-Samuelson public-goods condition
∑
dj = −C ′i(e∗i ) for all i, whose inverse is
e∗i = ei(
∑
dj) and which clearly represents a lower level of emissions than êi given by equa-
tion (4).
The total socially optimal emissions level of all jurisdictions is then
E∗ ≡
∑
e∗i =
∑
i
ei(
∑
j
dj), (7)
which is clearly lower than the free-riding total emissions Ê given by equation (6). The
corresponding uniform shadow price of socially optimal emissions (that also ensures cost
effectiveness) is p∗ =
∑
di, which is clearly higher than the average unlinked voluntary cap-
and-trade price
∑
p̂i/n=
∑
di/n. However, as an extension of the argument about cost
effectiveness given in the Introduction, socially optimal levels of CO2 emissions or the socially
optimal shadow emissions price of CO2 are largely irrelevant for strictly voluntary cap-and-
trade systems with no overarching top-down governance structure that can determine the
initial allocation of CO2 caps and penalize non-compliance. Absent such a powerful overall
governance structure, the socially optimal solution in a strictly voluntary cap-and-trade
system loses much of its rationale.
4 Linked Voluntary Cap-and-Trade Systems
Suppose that the n jurisdictions have been persuaded to link their cap-and-trade systems.
We now investigate the steady-state Nash-equilibrium outcome of such linkage. This case
presents far more of an analytical challenge than the case of unlinked cap-and-trade systems
due to the strategic interaction among linked jurisdictions.
Note that even though we presume that all jurisdictions play individually and non-
cooperatively against all other jurisdictions, some aspects of the rules of the game must
be agreed upon beforehand. In particular, property rights, which are traded on the permit
market, must be enforced. A jurisdiction must reveal its post-cap-and-trade permits to
9
ensure consistency with its actual post-cap-and-trade emissions. (This is the meaning of
Paragraph 6.2 of the COP21 Paris Agreement, previously referred to.)
Let the actual post-cap-and-trade emissions of jurisdiction i be denoted eai . For any
given exogenously-imposed CO2 permit (or allowance) price P , the actual-emissions reaction
of jurisdiction i is obtained by the condition −C ′i(ei(P )) = P . This condition yields the
same inverse-function formula as (3), rewritten here for emphasis as
eai = ei(P ), (8)
where e′i(P ) < 0.
Let Ea ≡ ∑ eai represent total actual post-cap-and-trade emissions. We now seek to
find the equilibrium permit price for the linked cap-and-trade system as a function of total
actual emissions, denoted P (Ea). Looking at actual emissions and adding up expression (8)
over all i, we obtain Ea(P ) =
∑
ei(P ), which, when inverted, yields the basic equation for
the equilibrium permit price as a function of total actual emissions, namely P (Ea).
Next, let eci represent the emissions permits or caps issued voluntarily by jurisdiction i.
The superscript ‘c’ stands for cap (and also for control variable). Define Ec ≡∑ eci to be
the total voluntary emissions caps or permits, and note that in equilibrium Ec = Ea. Let e˜ci
represent the Nash-equilibrium self-interested number of voluntary emissions permits issued
by jurisdiction i, contingent on Nash-equilibrium self-interested voluntary emissions permits
e˜cj for all other jurisdictions j 6= i. Then e˜ci must maximize over all possible voluntary
emissions caps eci the expression{
P (eci +
∑
j 6=i
e˜cj)× (eci − eai )
}
−
(
Di(e
c
i +
∑
j 6=i
e˜cj) + Ci(e
a
i )
)
, (9)
where we understand eai in expression (9) as being some implicit function of e
c
i .
The second term of (9), in round brackets, represents the loss of welfare to jurisdiction i
from emissions damages and costs.
Let us examine more closely the important expression within the curly brackets of (9).
If eai > e
c
i , then jurisdiction i is obliged to buy from other jurisdictions (e
a
i − eci) emissions
permits, costing it a cash loss of P × (eai − eci), which renders the expression in the curly
brackets of (9) negative, reflecting cash outflows out of jurisdiction i. If eai < e
c
i , then
jurisdiction i can sell to other jurisdictions (eci − eai ) emissions permits, earning it a cash
revenue of P × (eci − eai ), which renders the expression in the curly brackets of (9) positive,
reflecting cash inflows into jurisdiction i. To summarize here, the expression in the curly
brackets of (9) exactly equals the net cash flow into jurisdiction i from inter-jurisdictional
10
tradable permits.
The Nash-equilibrium linked cap-and-trade actual emissions of jurisdiction i is denoted
e˜ai . The Nash-equilibrium emissions permits (or caps) voluntarily issued by jurisdiction i
is denoted e˜ci . Taking derivatives with respect to e
c
i and making use of (1), the first-order
condition for e˜ci to maximize over all e
c
i expression (9) in a self-interested Nash equilibrium
is [
∂
∂eci
{
P (eci +
∑
j 6=i
e˜cj)× (eci − eai )
}]
eci=e˜
c
i ; e
a
i=e˜
a
i
−
(
di + C
′
i(e˜
a
i )
∂eai
∂eci
)
= 0. (10)
Let E˜ (=
∑
e˜ci =
∑
e˜ai ) be total Nash-equilibrium emissions in the linked cap-and-trade
system. Then the expression in the first term of the left hand side of equation (10) can be
evaluated in a Nash equilibrium as[
∂
∂eci
{
P (eci +
∑
j 6=i
e˜cj)× (eci − eai )
}]
eci=e˜
c
i ; e
a
i=e˜
a
i
= P (E˜)×
(
1− ∂e
a
i
∂eci
)
+ P ′(E˜)× (e˜ci − e˜ai ) .
(11)
Next, substitute (11) into equation (10). After rearranging terms, we then derive
di +
[
P (E˜) + C ′i(e˜
a
i )
] ∂eai
∂eci
− P (E˜)− P ′(E˜)× (e˜ci − e˜ai ) = 0. (12)
The term within the square brackets on the left hand side of (12) is zero because price
equals marginal abatement cost in a cap-and-trade system. The first-order condition (12)
then becomes
di − P (E˜)− P ′(E˜)× (e˜ci − e˜ai ) = 0. (13)
Add up over all i the expression (13), yielding the equation∑
di − nP (E˜)− P ′(E˜)×
∑
(e˜ci − e˜ai ) = 0. (14)
In equilibrium, ∑
e˜ai =
∑
e˜ci , (15)
so that the last term of the left hand side of equation (14) vanishes, turning equation (14)
into ∑
di − nP (E˜) = 0. (16)
Define d to be the average marginal damage across all n jurisdictions
d ≡
∑
di
n
, (17)
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and let P˜ ≡ P (E˜) be the equilibrium price of permits in the linked cap-and-trade system.
Then we have from (16) and (17) the fundamental result that
P˜ = d. (18)
It should be appreciated that equation (18) has been derived under extremely general
assumptions about the abatement cost functions. The only substantive assumption, which
accounts for the utter simplicity of expression (18), is the eminently defensible specification
that marginal damages are constant for CO2 emissions within a relatively short (5-10 year)
period.
5 Linked vs. Unlinked Voluntary Cap-and-Trade
We have already derived for the unlinked voluntary cap-and-trade system that the self-
volunteered autarchic price of permit within jurisdiction i is p̂i = di. Define P̂ to be the
average unlinked voluntary permit price over all jurisdictions
P̂ ≡
∑
p̂i
n
. (19)
Then, making use of (5), (17), and (19), equation (18) can be rewritten as
P˜ = P̂ . (20)
which means that the linked voluntary permit price is the average of the unlinked voluntary
permit prices.
We have repeatedly relied on the simplifying, but justified, assumption that, within a
relatively short period (say 5-10 years), marginal damages are constant for each jurisdiction.
Using this simplifying assumption again, how a linked jurisdiction sets its voluntary caps
relative to actual emissions (and whether the jurisdiction buys or sells CO2 permits) is fully
characterized by a simple condition depending on the relationship between the jurisdiction’s
marginal damages and the average marginal damages of the entire linked system.
From (18), P˜ (E) ≡ P˜ = d, and then equation (13) can be rewritten as
e˜ci − e˜ai = k × (d− di), (21)
where
12
k ≡ −1
P ′(E˜)
> 0 (22)
is viewed by all jurisdictions i as the same positive constant of proportionality.
Equation (21) is revealing. The only instrument under direct control of jurisdiction i
is its voluntary cap eci . Controlling the setting of its own voluntary cap e
c
i is the only way
for jurisdiction i to influence total emissions E˜. In Nash equilibrium, eci = e˜
c
i . It is then
natural to ask: When does jurisdiction i set its control cap eci(= e˜
c
i) relatively low and when
does jurisdiction i set its control cap eci(= e˜
c
i) relatively high? The natural benchmark
for the voluntary setting of cap eci(= e˜
c
i) is a comparison with the actual post-cap-and-trade
emissions of i – namely e˜ai . For all jurisdictions i, the actual equilibrium emissions e˜
a
i are a
natural standard for comparison with equilibrium cap e˜ci because
∑
e˜ci =
∑
e˜ai and because
{e˜ai } represents actual emissions normed to the same common price P˜ . Equation (21) tells
us exactly what is the sought-after difference (e˜ci − e˜ai ).
From equation (21), we have the quantitative result that e˜ci− e˜ai is directly proportional to
d−di with the same constant of proportionality k > 0 for all i. This implies two qualitative
results:
di > d ⇐⇒ e˜ci < e˜ai , (23)
and
di < d ⇐⇒ e˜ci > e˜ai . (24)
The interpretation of condition (23) should be relatively clear. When the marginal
damage di to jurisdiction i is greater than the average marginal damages of the entire linked
system d, then jurisdiction i wants its voluntary cap eci = e˜
c
i to be relatively lower, in order
to cut back total emissions even though, in this case, jurisdiction i ends up spending cash
to buy (e˜ai − e˜ci) > 0 emissions permits to counter-balance the relatively low setting of its
voluntary cap.
The interpretation of condition (24) should likewise be relatively clear (but in the opposite
direction of (23)). When the marginal damage di to jurisdiction i is less than the average
marginal damages of the entire linked system d, then jurisdiction i wants its voluntary cap
eci = e˜
c
i to be relatively higher, in order to allow total emissions to be higher, a direction
toward which jurisdiction i is relatively tolerant because di is relatively low. In this case,
jurisdiction i ends up with more cash by selling (e˜ci − e˜ai ) > 0 emissions permits to counter-
balance the relatively high setting of its voluntary cap, which is part of its motivation to
issue relatively higher emissions permits.
How do total emissions compare between linked and unlinked voluntary cap-and-trade
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systems? Going back to equation (3), we can derive a simple condition for comparing
total emissions, which, unfortunately, is not so simple to understand completely. A linked
voluntary cap-and-trade system emits less in total than an unlinked cap-and-trade system if∑
ei(di) >
∑
ei
(
d
)
, (25)
and conversely a linked voluntary cap-and-trade system emits more in total than an unlinked
cap-and-trade system if ∑
ei(di) <
∑
ei
(
d
)
. (26)
Each of the n terms of (25) and (26) can be signed. If di > d, then ei(di) < ei(d)
(with interpretation êi < e˜
a
i ). Conversely, if di < d, then ei(di) > ei(d) (with interpretation
êi > e˜
a
i ). This signing of ei(·) terms might be interpreted as hinting that the right and left
hand sides of (25) and (26) might not differ greatly from each other since roughly half of the
jurisdictions have the inequality in ei(·) going one way and roughly the other half have the
inequality in ei(·) going the other way. However, this is merely crude heuristic hand-waving,
not a formal argument.
Conditions (25) and (26) are not easy to analyze rigorously and could go either way,
depending here on the distribution of the {di} and the functions {ei(·)}. The literature is
not decisive on this issue. Plausible arguments have been made on both sides.7
It is also difficult to characterize in general whether a jurisdiction has higher welfare
from joining a linked cap-and-trade system or from remaining autarchic. It might have
been presumed on basic principles of trade theory that joining a linked cap-and-trade system
(offering a quasi-constant permit price of emissions) delivers higher welfare to a jurisdiction
than remaining at the fixed autarchic level of emissions. However, this presumption does
not hold in general for the situation here, where jurisdictions are gaming the system by
strategically setting their own tradable emissions caps. 8
7For example, Holtsmark and Sommervoll (2012) plausibly argue that total emissions are likely to be
higher under linked voluntary cap-and-trade than under unlinked voluntary cap-and-trade. On the other
hand, Carbone, Helm, and Rutherford (2009) plausibly argue that total emissions are likely to be lower under
linked voluntary cap-and-trade than under unlinked voluntary cap-and-trade. Both of these two examples
involve static games (as does this paper). In a dynamic model with both fossil fuels and renewables,
Holtsmark and Midtømme (2016) argue that linking leads to lower emissions. At this stage we think it is
an open question how linkage of cap-and-trade systems influences emissions.
8Section III of Godal and Holtsmark (2011) contains just such a counterexample where joining a linked
cap-and-trade system yields lower welfare to a jurisdiction than remaining at the fixed autarchic level of
emissions. In this paper we restrict ourselves to comparing linked and unlinked voluntary cap-and-trade
systems without inquiring deeply into the individual motivations for participating in a linked system.
14
6 Concluding Remarks
An appropriate and widely accepted specification for the marginal damages of CO2 emissions
within a relatively short (5-10 years, say) period is that they are constant for each jurisdic-
tion. This critical, but defensible, assumption greatly clarifies the analysis and yields simple
closed-form expressions for all (linked and unlinked) CO2 emissions prices. The current pa-
per has derived and discussed some implications of this simplicity for linked and unlinked
voluntary CO2 cap-and-trade systems. How a linked jurisdiction sets its voluntary caps
relative to actual emissions (and whether the jurisdiction buys or sells CO2 permits) is fully
characterized by a simple linear proportionality condition that depends only on the differ-
ence between the jurisdiction’s marginal damages and the average marginal damages of the
entire linked system. Whether linkage increases or decreases overall emissions depends on
a condition that is easy to express but difficult to evaluate rigorously, and the answer could
go either way.
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